Viktor Orban's electoral defeat raises questions about the durability of the bilateral relationahip with China, and the safety of Chinese investments there.
Hungary is currently the prime destination for Chinese investments in the EU, with a share of over 30 to 40% depending on the years, making China the largest foreign investor in Hungary for three consecutive years.
Orban has recently declared that Chinese investment drives Hungarian economic growth, "especially in modern industries" (solar, batteries, EVs...)
Hungary currently offers the best conditions in Europe for East-West cooperation, and that was the primary driver for China's Eximbank to consider making Hungary its hub for European operations.
With the new government in place, it is reasonable to imagine that Eximbank will adopt a wait-and-see approach, to give the new government time to demonstrate that it isn't going to rock the boat of China-Hungary relations.
All this was possible because of Orban's China-friendly policies, and his spirit of independence, often leading him to counter EU policies hostile to China.
The new Prime minister Magyar is expected to lean closer to Brussels than Orban did, thus putting a question mark on the longevity of Chinese investments there.
Hungary and China are also close diplomatically, being both members of the Friends of Peace group in the UN.
That is potentially under threat now with the new Prime minister, who is expected to be more supportive of the EU's policies on Ukraine than Orban was.
Spain is a close second in the race to attract Chinese investments in the EU.
Prime minister Sanchez is back in China this week, his fourth visit in four years!
Spain's pragmatism and openness reflect a positive, long-standing current in China-Europe relations carried by countries such as Italy, Hungary, Spain, Ireland.
Sanchez recent official visits aim at ensuring that Chinese investment in Spain result in both technology transfer and integration into local value chains that go beyond the simple assembly of parts.
It isn't so different from EU's own requests to China, but the message is delivered in a collaborative, long-term, mutually beneficial way, instead of Ursula & Kaja's trademark awkward confrontational approach.
Spain's new Asia-Pacific strategy is also emphasizing enhanced dialogue with China.
Its very name, "Asia-Pacific", and not EU's and France's "Indo-Pacific", reveals Spain's will to increase its (relative) strategic autonomy, and its reluctance to blindly follow the US' strategy in the region.
Spain's strategy will be to deepen political and economic ties through a stronger diplomatic presence on the ground, as well as to work together with regional partners to generate shared, sustainable, and secure growth opportunities.
Finally, and most interestingly, when the Global Times reports on Sanchez visit, it also list down the other Western leaders who have been to Beijing since the beginning of 2026 (Micheal Martin, Petteri Orpo, Keir Starmer and Friedrich Merz), but omits Macron's visit.
This is a subtle message that the Chinese diplomacy isn't fooled by and doesn't approve of Macron's double dealing : deceiving Beijing with friendly gestures one day in Chengdu, backstabbing it the next day by supporting EU's hostile policies towards China.
The next few months might see drastic changes in China's investment strategy in the EU.
