Air crash. Investigations ✈️

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Air crash. Investigations ✈️

About air crashes and air accidents, their causes and significance for flight safety. Russian version @rumayday Contact @Safetyofficerr

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Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

📷 Photo

Snow-Covered Field

On 13 January 1990, an Aeroflot Tu-134A departed Tyumen for Volgograd with an intermediate stop in Ufa. There were 65 passengers and six crew members on board.

After climbing to 10,650 meters, the cockpit warning system indicated “Fire in the aft baggage compartment.” The flight engineer grabbed a fire extinguisher and went to inspect the compartment. It was indeed filled with smoke, but he could not identify the source. Meanwhile, the fire began damaging wiring. As a result, the flight recorders were lost, and several warnings activated spuriously. Despite this, the aircraft remained fully controllable.

The crew reported an on-board fire to ATC and received clearance for an emergency descent and diversion to Sverdlovsk. Due to cloud cover, the aircraft’s radar return was intermittent, so the controller was able to provide only bearings. At the same time, electrical equipment continued to fail one after another. At 1,800 meters, the crew reported a fire indication on both engines.

To reduce thrust and landing speed, the right engine was shut down. Eleven seconds later, the attitude indicators for both pilots and the KS-8 heading system “froze.” With their exact position unknown and navigation instruments failing in sequence, the crew decided to carry out a forced landing on the nearest suitable site - a snow-covered field about 1,000 meters long.

Eleven minutes after the smoke was first detected, the aircraft touched down with the landing gear extended and the flaps retracted. After rolling 148 meters, it became airborne again, flew 104 meters, and touched down a second time. After another 44 meters it lifted off once more and, after a further 180 meters, touched down for the third time - and at that moment struck a fixed irrigation installation. The right wing, together with the right main landing gear nacelle, separated. The Tu-134 overturned, slid inverted for several hundred meters, hit trees along a shelterbelt, and broke apart. The final stop occurred 1,028 meters from the first touchdown point. Twenty-seven people died at the crash site and later in hospitals, including four crew members (the captain, the first officer, the navigator, and a flight attendant).

The investigation determined that the fire originated in the area of the aft baggage compartment due to an electrical short circuit caused by damaged wire insulation. This was the only seat of fire: both engines and the APU remained serviceable, and there were no signs of fire on either. When the aircraft became completely de-energised before landing, the fire ceased immediately.

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Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

http://telegraph.controller.bot/files/733273611/AgACAgIAAxkBAAI2b2l9G8sPCoGhwLOSWNwxnE8NA5CeAAKSFGsbPM3oS-Myj1biuYYtAQADAgADeQADOAQDistracted by the Ship

On July 30, 1998, a small Beechcraft 1900D operated by Proteus Airlines was on a domestic flight from Lyon to Lorient in France. There were 12 passengers and 2 crew members on board.

As the aircraft neared its destination, one of the passengers entered the cockpit and suggested flying over the bay. That day, the world's longest cruise ship at the time, the Norway, was arriving, and he thought it would be exciting to view the engineering marvel from the air. The pilots liked the idea and decided to give the passengers a little in-flight entertainment. They received clearance from air traffic control to deviate from their route and headed toward the sea.

Descending to 1,100 meters, the crew switched from instrument flight rules (IFR) to visual flight rules (VFR). That meant they were now responsible for visually identifying and avoiding other aircraft. Soon, the pilots spotted the cruise ship, descended to about 610 meters, and began circling it so passengers could enjoy the impressive view.

At the same time, a Cessna 177RG Cardinal was also in the area. Its only occupant was a 70-year-old veteran pilot with 15,000 flight hours, 13,000 of them as captain. He was descending from 900 to 460 meters and was also admiring the massive cruise liner.

After completing the circle, the Beechcraft crew contacted the controller to report their intention to land. The controller gave them clearance - but suddenly, all radio contact with the aircraft was lost. From the cruise ship and nearby yachts, horrified onlookers saw the Beechcraft break apart midair and crash into the sea. All 14 people on board were killed.

The theory of a midair collision emerged after it was discovered that the Cessna had gone missing. Wreckage recovered from the seabed confirmed it: the Cessna had slammed into the Beechcraft’s right side at full speed, causing both planes to lose control. The Cessna pilot was also killed.

The investigation revealed that the Cessna’s transponder was turned off. At the time, transponder use was not mandatory for visual flight. Because of this, the Cessna didn’t appear on radar, and the controller had no way to warn the Beechcraft crew.

Moreover, the collision avoidance system (TCAS) couldn’t function without a transponder signal. Not that it mattered - the Beechcraft wasn’t equipped with TCAS anyway, as the system wasn't certified in France at the time.

During the flyover, the Beechcraft was being flown by the first officer. The captain, seated on the left, was responsible for monitoring surrounding airspace. However, the cockpit layout made it difficult for him to see to the right. A left-hand turn with a bank only worsened visibility, leaving the incoming Cessna unnoticed.

Meanwhile, the Cessna pilot also failed to spot the Beechcraft - it was in his blind spot. And both crews were clearly distracted by the view of the Norway.

The crash occurred because both aircraft, flying under visual flight rules in uncontrolled airspace, failed to detect each other in time to avoid a collision. Following the tragedy, a recommendation was issued stating that visual flight in commercial passenger operations should be used only when strictly necessary.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

📷 Photo

Fatal Barrel Roll

On May 17, 1986, an Aeroflot Yakovlev Yak-40 was preparing for takeoff from Khanty-Mansiysk Airport for a test flight following repairs to the nose landing gear. The five crew members had not been properly prepared for the flight, as they were called in at the last minute.

The Yak-40 departed the airport for a routine circuit and planned landing. Once it reached an altitude of 6,000 meters, the crew requested permission to remain at that altitude for five minutes to complete their assignment. While maintaining a speed of 390 km/h and steady engine power, the aircraft performed several steep turns with bank angles up to 60 degrees. During the exit from a left turn, the pilot pulled back on the control column, raising the nose and reducing speed to 360 km/h.

Fourteen seconds later, the crew began a barrel roll - an aerobatic maneuver where the aircraft rolls around its longitudinal axis. However, the control column remained pulled back throughout the roll. As a result, eight seconds into the maneuver, the aircraft, now inverted, dropped its nose and began to lose altitude. When the speed reached 470 km/h, the crew reduced thrust on all three engines and stopped the rotation. At this point, the Yak-40 was descending at 100 meters per second, and the pilots tried to level the aircraft.

At an altitude of 4,500 meters and speed of 620 km/h, the vertical load reached 5.25 g - about 1.5 times higher than the maximum allowed (3.4 g). At that moment, a section of the left wing broke off, struck the vertical stabilizer, and tore it off along with the horizontal stabilizers and both rudders. The Yak-40 lost all control and entered a chaotic spin. Due to extreme loads, the flaps and parts of the right wing skin also detached. The aircraft ultimately crashed and was completely destroyed. Everyone on board was killed.

According to the investigation, the crash was caused by severe violations by the crew, who performed prohibited maneuvers during the test flight. Additionally, the airline's command staff committed gross violations in organizing the flight. The commission also noted poor discipline, lack of proper oversight, and inadequate control of test flights within the Khanty-Mansiysk aviation unit.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

📷 Photo

"I don’t follow orders": Turkish Airlines pilot refuses to descend as instructed by ATC

At the end of December, a Turkish Airlines flight from Istanbul was approaching Muscat International Airport, the capital of Oman. The Airbus A321neo was concluding a flight that lasted more than four hours.

During the final approach, the air traffic controller instructed the crew to descend to 2,200 feet. However, the pilot refused to comply, citing company procedures and minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) charts, which indicated that in this sector, a safe altitude was no lower than 3,600 feet.

Muscat approach: “Sir, descend to 2,200, an accurate to my minimum, you are under vectoring, sir.”
Turkish Airlines pilot: “Unable to accept vectors due to company procedures, Turkish 2YJ. We can accept only 3,600, over MSA.”
Muscat approach: “The MSA is 2,200, Turkish 2YJ. You follow my orders. Instructions are instructions, sir.”
Turkish Airlines pilot: “I am sorry, I don’t follow anyone’s orders, we can talk about it once we are landed. I am sorry, I can only accept 3,600, you may sequence accordingly. I am sorry again.”
Muscat approach: “Turkish 2YJ, we’re not playing with safety, sir.”
Turkish Airlines pilot: “Can you vector me to establish from 3,600? Turkish 2YJ.”
Muscat approach: “Expect vectors and speed 210 now, and fly hearing 090, you’ll be number two.”

The conversation then returned to normal, though the topic of altitude came up again shortly afterward:

Muscat approach: “Turkish 2YJ, just to remind you, our safety is a major factor. If I give you an altitude, you must follow. Your company doesn’t know our rules, huh?”
Turkish Airlines pilot: “Yes, I will let my company to learn it, I am sorry for the inconvenience. I will do my best for them to get it also.”
Muscat approach: “It’s not really an inconvenience, 3,600 is GESOS altitude restriction, it’s not the minimum safe altitude. My minimum safe altitude is 2,200, I will not, I’m not playing with safety.”
Turkish Airlines pilot: “I know, but I don’t have your minimum safe altitude on my charts, that’s why I couldn’t descend, I will talk to my company to get your safe altitude in my aircraft.”

The pilot firmly stood his ground. In aviation, the final responsibility for safety always lies with the pilot-in-command. If an instruction from the ground contradicts the information available on board, the pilot has the right to decline it.

In the end, the aircraft landed safely in Muscat.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

📷 Photo

Journey to China

On December 19, 1985, an Aeroflot Antonov An-24B was operating a scheduled passenger flight along the route Yakutsk - Neryungri - Chita - Irkutsk. On board were 46 passengers and 5 crew members. In addition to the pilots, the crew included a navigator, a flight engineer, and a flight attendant.

As the aircraft approached Chita, the navigator left the cockpit to use the lavatory. Shortly after, the 33-year-old co-pilot, Shamil Gadzhi-Ogly Alimuradov, also exited the cockpit and entered the cabin. He soon returned and informed the captain that the flight attendant needed the flight engineer’s assistance. Once the engineer left the cockpit, the co-pilot locked the door from the inside and held a homemade knife to the captain’s throat, demanding the plane be flown to China.

The captain managed to discreetly alert air traffic control of the hijacking by pressing a special alarm button. He then attempted to divert the aircraft to a nearby military airfield, but Alimuradov noticed the maneuver and forced the captain to stay on course.

As the plane neared the Soviet-Chinese border, the captain contacted the controller again and explained the situation. He was given radio compass settings for the nearest accessible Chinese airport - Qiqihar. Once the Soviet aircraft entered Chinese airspace, the Chinese army did not scramble fighters to intercept it. However, the crew soon noticed the radio compass needle changing direction multiple times.

The captain suspected that the Chinese were deliberately guiding the plane off course and circling it over mountainous terrain in the hope it would crash. He decided to perform an emergency landing. The An-24 successfully landed in a rice field near the town of Gannan in Heilongjiang province in northeastern China. No one on board was injured, and the aircraft sustained only minor damage.

Chinese authorities took the co-pilot to Harbin for interrogation. Twenty-nine hours after the landing, the passengers and crew were transported by car to Qiqihar, and on December 21, to Harbin, from where they were flown back to Chita on a special flight. Alimuradov later stated that his motive for the hijacking was resentment toward his superiors for repeatedly denying him a promotion to captain. After he filed complaints with higher authorities, he was sent for several neurological evaluations and even temporarily suspended from flying.

On March 4, 1986, a Chinese court sentenced Shamil Alimuradov to eight years in prison. He was released on parole two years later. In 1989, he was extradited to the Soviet Union, where a Soviet court sentenced him to an additional five years of imprisonment the following year. Captain Vyacheslav Abramyan was initially suspended from flying but returned to duty two years later.

The hijacked An-24 was returned to the Soviet Union in January 1986. After undergoing repairs, it continued to operate in service. In 2000, the aircraft was retired and stored at the Yakutsk airport. In 2009, it was dismantled for scrap.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

🎥 Video

Test Flight Didn’t Go as Planned

On May 2, 1980, a McDonnell Douglas MD-80 was performing a test flight in California. The goal was to determine the horizontal distance required for landing and a full stop on the runway. There were seven people on board.

The aircraft was approaching Edwards Air Force Base with a vertical descent rate of 3.6 meters per second. Just before touchdown, the pilots noticed an increase in the rate of descent and gently pulled back on the control yoke to reduce it. However, the aircraft made a very hard landing, which was caught on video.

Upon touchdown, the main landing gear collapsed and the tail section broke off. The pilots had no clear understanding of the extent of the damage and followed standard braking procedures, using thrust reversers and brakes. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway. Of the seven people onboard, only the flight engineer was injured, suffering a broken leg.

The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the incident was caused by pilot error – the failure to perform a stabilized approach. A contributing factor was the absence of test flight procedures requiring other crew members to monitor critical flight parameters.

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Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

http://telegraph.controller.bot/files/733273611/AgACAgIAAxkBAAI2CmlhePuwqQcyF5DhiJK1wKwc_YZEAAKzE2sbVU0IS-5Um91dWPKtAQADAgADeAADOAQController Negligence and Mid-Air Collision Over Irkutsk

On December 4, 1974, an An-12B was performing a training flight in the area of Irkutsk Airport, conducting a series of approaches to the paved runway. There were five crew members on board.

At the same time, local An-2 aircraft were taking off from an unpaved runway located about 2.5 kilometers away. According to the published procedure, after takeoff they were to make a left turn, climb to 300 meters, and then cross the centerline of the paved runway. Because of this, overflights of the paved runway were only allowed at altitudes not exceeding 200 meters.

Soon, weather conditions worsened. The sky became overcast with clouds, the cloud base dropped to 440 meters, snow began to fall, and visibility decreased to 2,000 meters. In response, the deputy airport manager prohibited all visual flights from the unpaved runway.

However, 20 minutes later, a local air traffic controller observed that actual visibility at the departure point was 2,500 meters - above the required minimum - and cleared an An-2 for takeoff despite the standing ban.

Due to the weather, one of the An-2 pilots was replaced before the flight with a more experienced one who had not originally been scheduled to fly that day. Four minutes after receiving clearance, the An-2 took off with 11 passengers and 2 pilots on board and began climbing according to the standard procedure.

Meanwhile, the An-12 had completed another approach and descended to 100 meters, reporting its altitude to the approach controller. The crew then initiated a go-around and began climbing to 200 meters. Afterward, they switched to the circuit frequency, where the controller had just been replaced by the flight operations director. However, the local ATC controller failed to inform the director about the An-2’s departure.

Unaware of the actual traffic situation and believing that no takeoffs were taking place from the unpaved runway, the flight director authorized the An-12 to climb directly to 600 meters.

Four minutes after takeoff, the An-2, flying at an altitude of 270 meters, collided at a right angle with the underside of the An-12’s fuselage, directly over the center of the paved runway. The An-2 broke apart from the impact, and its wreckage fell 200 meters north of the runway and caught fire. All 13 people on board the An-2 were killed.

The An-12 was more fortunate. The pilots felt a strong jolt and then noticed a sharp left bank. The crew shut down all engines, feathered the propellers, and executed a forced landing in a floodplain of the Ushakovka River. Upon landing, the aircraft struck a 10-meter-tall lightning rod tower, which collapsed onto the An-12, destroying its center wing section. Both left engines were torn off, one right propeller separated, and the lower fuselage was heavily damaged. However, no fire broke out, and all five crew members survived.

The investigation identified several contributing factors. First, the local ATC controller showed criminal negligence by authorizing the An-2’s takeoff despite the ban, and by failing to coordinate its flight path over the paved runway with the circuit controller. Second, the flight operations director, acting as circuit controller, did not properly manage the shift and, unaware of the traffic situation, effectively abdicated overall control of flight operations in deteriorating visibility. Third, the deputy airport manager failed to ensure enforcement of his own order prohibiting local flight operations.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

http://telegraph.controller.bot/files/733273611/AgACAgIAAxkBAAI1z2k8b3Gpl4vlVsOYmWUeDkgu4j3PAAKqD2sbovXhSbO2vYYNFRggAQADAgADeAADNgQA Small Detail

On August 20, 2007, a China Airlines Boeing 737-809 was operating a flight from Taipei, Taiwan, to Naha, Japan. There were 165 people on board (157 passengers and 8 crew members).

The aircraft landed normally and had already taxied to the gate when passengers noticed flames near the right wing and right engine. At the same moment, the pilots received a “Engine No. 2 Fire” warning. The cabin quickly filled with black smoke. The cabin crew began an evacuation through the emergency exits, and passengers left the aircraft via the inflatable slides.

By the time the last passenger was off the airplane, the fire had already engulfed half of the fuselage. The pilots evacuated last. The first officer climbed out through the cockpit window; at that moment an explosion occurred and he fell to the ground, but he was not injured. As the captain began to climb out through the same window, two more explosions followed and the aircraft broke apart, yet the captain was also uninjured. The entire evacuation took six minutes. No one was killed, but four people were injured, including an airport worker.

Investigators quickly determined that the fire was caused by a fuel leak. When they examined the wing fuel tank, they found a dented bolt that had punctured the tank wall and compromised its seal. While the aircraft was taxiing, the airflow from the operating right engine prevented the leaking fuel from reaching hot engine components. However, once the engine was shut down, fuel spilled onto the hot exhaust nozzle and ignited.

The dented bolt was part of a mechanism that served as a limit stop for slat extension. Several weeks before the incident, at the manufacturer’s request, airline maintenance personnel had modified this mechanism. The change involved bonding a nut to the bolt with adhesive to prevent it from repeatedly working loose. Because the attachment point was difficult to access, the mechanics tightened and loosened the bolt by feel, effectively working “blind.” During the procedure, a washer - which prevented the bolt from slipping out of the mechanism - fell out unnoticed.

The bolt, which came loose during landing, remained inside a “cup” into which the slat retracts very tightly. This “cup” is located inside the fuel tank. As a result, when the slats were retracted, powerful hydraulics drove the bolt into the fuel tank wall, causing the leak and the fire.

After the investigation, Boeing urgently inspected 737-800 aircraft worldwide. In the United States alone, more than 20 aircraft were found to have a similar potential hazard. The locking device was later redesigned across the fleet.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

http://telegraph.controller.bot/files/733273611/AgACAgIAAxkBAAI192lFpBUw-Whdfw9DIHLLpLIF0_4SAAJpC2sbsdsxSlHaKoxKVEuKAQADAgADeAADNgQLanding in a Cornfield. Soviet version

On 8 August 1970, an Aeroflot An-10A departed Vinnytsia for Simferopol. There were 107 passengers and 7 crew on board.

About ten minutes after takeoff, the aircraft climbed to 5,400 meters. Suddenly, the pilots saw smoke in the cockpit and smelled burning insulation. The flight engineer went to the forward cabin and reported to the captain that smoke was coming through gaps in a ceiling panel. The captain ordered the crew to switch to emergency electrical power, reduce speed, and lower engine thrust. He then extended the landing gear and began an emergency descent.

At 4,000 meters, the first officer shut off the bleed air from all four engines, initiated an emergency depressurization, and depressurized the aircraft. After that, the smoke stopped. The captain decided to divert to the nearest airport, Chișinău. The crew retracted the landing gear but continued descending to 2,400 meters.

Suddenly, there was a sharp bang. The first officer and the flight engineer then saw a fire on engine No. 4 (the outer right engine). The captain ordered the propeller to be feathered and the fire extinguishing system to be activated. At the same time, he began turning the aircraft toward flat terrain suitable for a forced landing. However, three minutes later, at an altitude of about 1,000 meters, the engine fire stopped, so the captain decided to try to make it to Chișinău after all.

With 80 kilometers remaining to the airport, the flight engineer reported a problem in the hydraulic system. This could cause the No. 4 engine propeller to unfeather on its own and enter autorotation. That is exactly what happened when the aircraft was 55 kilometers from Chișinău, at an altitude of 720-730 meters.

The sudden increase in drag caused a right bank and the aircraft began to yaw. The pilots applied full left control inputs and advanced the remaining three engines to takeoff power. They managed to prevent the speed from dropping. But because only one engine was producing thrust on the right wing while two were running on the left wing, the asymmetric thrust made the right bank and right turn even worse.

Realizing it was impossible to reach the runway under these conditions, the captain decided to perform a forced landing. At dusk, he spotted what appeared to be a flat cornfield. However, he did not know that beneath the two-meter-tall stalks there was a shallow ravine running perpendicular to the landing direction.

The An-10 landed “on its belly.” After plowing through the ground, the aircraft jumped over the ravine, then slammed into the opposite slope and continued forward, breaking apart. About 275 meters from the initial touchdown point, the aircraft yawed around and came to a stop. The crew completed the evacuation in roughly 15 minutes. Four passengers were seriously injured and 21 sustained minor injuries. No one died at the crash site, but one critically injured passenger died on the way to the hospital.

The accident was caused by the failure and fire of engine No. 4. The engine failed because a turbine roller bearing was destroyed due to oil starvation after the jet orifices in the fuel-nozzle ring became clogged with oil decomposition products (coke). As a result, responsibility was attributed to the engine manufacturer, which had allowed a design deficiency in the AI-20K engine and had not taken measures to prevent this defect - oil coking in the turbine roller-bearing assembly.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

13 мая 2026 г., 06:58

http://telegraph.controller.bot/files/733273611/AgACAgIAAxkBAAI1lmkzI8PcM-pyCT3BEbBA3DGqk17CAAKzD2sbe3eZSdjWVzeJWB3_AQADAgADeAADNgQFaulty Warning System

On January 13, 1977, an Aeroflot Tu-104A was operating a flight from Khabarovsk via Novosibirsk to Alma-Ata. On board were 90 people - 82 passengers and 8 crew members.

The aircraft was approaching its final destination, Alma-Ata. At a distance of 12 kilometers from the airport, while descending through 500 meters and with flaps extended, the left engine’s power began to slowly decrease. Twenty-two seconds later, vibrations appeared. Noticing irregularities in the left engine, the crew retracted the flaps to 20°. Eight kilometers from the airport, the pilots reported a failure of the left engine and their intention to land using the right one. They shut down the left engine and increased power on the right. Two kilometers later, the aircraft, 400 meters to the right of the approach path, began quickly moving back toward the centerline. After another 1,200 meters, it crossed the course line and continued to drift.

At 3.5 kilometers from the runway, at an altitude of 195 meters, the plane abruptly pitched up and climbed to 285 meters. This sudden maneuver caused a sharp loss of speed, and the aircraft entered a stall. During the final radio transmission, the crew uttered two unintelligible words. Three seconds later, at a speed of 150–190 km/h and a pitch angle of 28°, the aircraft slammed into a snow-covered field. The impact tore off the tail. The nose and both wings buried themselves two meters into the ground, exploded, and burned completely. The aircraft crashed 3,280 meters from the runway threshold. Everyone on board died.

The investigation determined that the cause of the crash was a fire in the left engine. Witnesses on the ground saw flames, but the pilots had no indication of it and never activated the fire extinguishing system - the fire warning never triggered. It was found that the fire originated in the area of the left engine due to a fuel leak caused by the destruction of a fuel line section between the booster pump and the fire shutoff valve. The damage likely resulted from heat exposure from a cabin pressurization duct that either ruptured or lost its seal.

As the aircraft slowed during the final approach, the fire intensified, affecting the plane’s controllability. People may have begun suffocating from carbon monoxide and, possibly in panic, rushed toward the tail, shifting the center of gravity rearward. The toxic gas was released by insulation materials that had been heated from the outside of the fuselage. Why the aircraft suddenly pitched up right before the crash - a maneuver that led to the stall - remains unclear, as the flight data recorder stopped working 20 seconds before impact.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

3 апр. 2026 г., 09:02

📷 Photo

The NTSB has released a preliminary report on the crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 in Louisville

According to the report, taxiing and the takeoff roll were normal. The problems began at liftoff. Airport surveillance footage showed that shortly after the aircraft’s nose lifted off the runway, the left engine, along with its pylon - the structure attaching the engine to the wing - separated from the left wing. While still airborne, a fire ignited in the area of the detached engine, which flew over the fuselage and fell to the ground near the runway. A fire also broke out at the pylon-to-wing attachment point and continued burning until the aircraft impacted the ground.

After liftoff, the aircraft managed to climb only about 30 feet. It cleared the fence at the end of the runway, but then struck the roof of a UPS warehouse near the airport’s southern boundary with its left landing gear. It then crashed through an open-air storage area and two additional buildings, including a petroleum processing facility. Spilled fuel triggered a large fire. All three pilots on board were killed. On the ground, 11 people died and more than 20 others were injured.

The tower controller noted that the aircraft’s takeoff roll speed appeared normal for this type of plane, but the rate of climb was unusually low - the plane never climbed higher than the control tower, roughly 200 feet tall. Another witness reported that the aircraft first stopped climbing, then began to descend, banking to the left before crashing.

The crew was highly experienced. Both the captain and first officer had thousands of hours on the MD-11. A relief pilot with significant total flight time was also on board.

Both the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder were recovered and successfully downloaded. They contained data not only from the accident flight but also from previous flights.

Investigators are focusing on the engine-to-wing attachment point. On the MD-11, engines are mounted beneath the wings using pylons that connect at multiple points - a forward mount that bears thrust loads, and an aft mount with a spherical bearing assembly. It was this aft attachment on the left pylon that failed. Wreckage analysis revealed parts of the pylon, fittings from the rear mount, and a section of the wing with a bolt and fractured spherical bearing still in place.

At the NTSB lab, after cleaning the fracture surfaces, investigators found not only signs of overload failure but also evidence of fatigue cracking in the rear mount’s fittings - cracks that grow slowly over time under repeated stress. On some surfaces, the cracks originated from the bolt holes; others showed signs of sudden failure. The bearing itself was also destroyed.

The aircraft was 34 years old, with nearly 93,000 flight hours and about 21,000 takeoff and landing cycles. UPS maintained it under a continuous airworthiness program. According to company procedures, the rear pylon attachment was subject to visual inspection every six years - the last one occurred in 2021. A separate lubrication of the struts and spherical joints was performed about two weeks before the crash. A more detailed inspection of this attachment point had been scheduled for a later date.

Following the crash, UPS temporarily grounded its MD-11 fleet. Shortly after, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive effectively grounding all MD-11 and MD-11F aircraft until inspections and potential defects were addressed. Within days, the directive was expanded to include DC-10 aircraft, which have a similar engine mounting design. A global inspection effort of these aircraft was launched.

In its preliminary report, the NTSB references the 1979 crash of an American Airlines DC-10 near Chicago. In that case, the left engine and pylon also separated during takeoff, causing the aircraft to lose control and crash, killing 273 people. That accident was attributed to a combination of design issues and improper maintenance procedures. Investigators are now examining whether a similar combination of factors played a role in the

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

3 апр. 2026 г., 09:02

http://telegraph.controller.bot/files/733273611/AgACAgIAAxkBAAI1iGkx74tsPZ6SP5R3JYwOxHBhJzTeAALeDGsbZr-QSbm0UIFgiUxOAQADAgADbQADNgQFoggy Runway

On October 8, 2001, a thick fog settled over Milan's Linate Airport. Visibility dropped at times to as little as 50 meters.

A brand-new Cessna 525A CitationJet CJ2, with only 28 hours of flight time, was preparing for a flight to Paris. On board were two pilots and two passengers.

The crew was instructed to taxi to the runway via northern taxiway R5. However, in the dense fog, the pilots failed to see the faded and unclear markings and mistakenly turned onto taxiway R6, which led directly to the middle of the active runway. The airport had no ground radar, and the runway incursion warning system was disabled. As a result, in such low visibility conditions, the controllers had no way of knowing where the aircraft had actually gone.

Meanwhile, at the start of the same runway, a McDonnell Douglas MD-87 operated by Scandinavian Airlines System was preparing for departure to Copenhagen. There were 110 people on board: 6 crew members and 104 passengers. Shortly after, the MD-87 crew was cleared for takeoff and began accelerating down the runway. The aircraft reached 270 km/h and had just started to lift off when the Cessna suddenly appeared in its path.

The collision was devastating. The business jet was completely destroyed. The MD-87 lost its right landing gear and right engine. The aircraft briefly became airborne, but quickly lost speed and crashed back onto the runway. It veered sharply to the left, skidded across the tarmac, and overran the runway. At around 200 km/h, it slammed into a baggage hangar, was completely destroyed, and caught fire.

For some time, air traffic controllers were unaware that a collision had occurred and failed to sound the alarm. As a result, firefighters arrived at the scene only 20 minutes later. Had they responded sooner, they might have saved the Cessna’s pilots, who eventually died from carbon monoxide poisoning after being trapped in the cockpit.

In total, 118 people lost their lives in the disaster: all 110 on board the MD-87, all 4 occupants of the Cessna 525A, and 4 people inside the baggage hangar.

The investigation found that the accident was caused by a combination of factors: dense fog, errors by both the controller and the business jet pilots, the lack of ground radar, poor runway markings that were not visible from the cockpit, the disabled runway incursion warning system, and other safety deficiencies.

The ground controller and several regulatory officials were sentenced to prison terms by the court.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

3 апр. 2026 г., 09:02

📷 Photo

Strong winds blew a passenger jet off the runway

On the evening of December 20, 2008, a Continental Airlines Boeing 737-500 was operating a domestic flight from Denver to Houston. There were 115 people on board: 110 passengers and 5 crew members.

The captain, an experienced 50-year-old pilot with over 13,000 flight hours, including more than 6,300 on the Boeing 737, completed the standard pre-departure procedures with the first officer and received takeoff clearance at 18:17. ATC passed along the weather. It was cold in Denver but snow-free. A crosswind was reported on the runway, with a speed of up to 50 km/h.

The aircraft began its takeoff roll under the captain’s control. During the roll he gradually advanced the throttles to takeoff power. Nothing seemed out of the ordinary - until 18:18, when the aircraft suddenly veered sharply left. The trigger was a strong crosswind gust reaching 92 km/h.

The captain pressed the right pedal to realign the aircraft, then changed his mind and released it. The pedals primarily control the rudder and the nose landing gear steering: pressing the left pedal turns the nose left, pressing the right turns it right. As a result, the aircraft failed to re-align with the runway and, four seconds later, departed its edge.

The captain initiated a rejected takeoff. Shortly afterward the aircraft crossed a ravine, bounced up and slammed back onto the ground. The left engine separated and fell away, and the right engine caught fire. After sliding several hundred meters, the aircraft came to a stop 1,655 meters from the terminal building. During the ground slide the airframe broke into two sections.

Both pilots, injured, were incapacitated for about two minutes and did not run the emergency checklist. The flight attendants in the cabin began the evacuation on their own. The first officer soon recovered from shock and noticed the engine fire. The captain also came to and, with help from the first officer and a flight attendant, exited the aircraft. They were the last to evacuate through the forward door.

Fortunately, no one was killed. However, 38 people sustained injuries of varying severity. Two passengers and the captain were hospitalized with serious injuries. Because of the right-engine fire, the fuselage on the starboard side was completely burned out.

A landing gear malfunction was initially suspected, but it was not confirmed - the gear was normal. In July 2010 the final investigation report was released. It concluded the accident resulted from captain error: during the wind shift he stopped applying right pedal to keep the aircraft aligned with the runway centerline, allowing it to drift left and run off the runway. A contributing factor was the lack of precise wind information for the runway.

Air crash. Investigations ✈️

3 апр. 2026 г., 09:02

📷 Photo

Flight engineer mixed everything up

On 30 June 1990, an Il-62M operated by Aeroflot took off from Moscow bound for Yakutsk. There were 99 passengers and 10 crew members on board.

It was a night landing. After touchdown, the captain called for reverse thrust. However, the flight engineer mixed everything up and advanced two of the four engines to takeoff thrust instead. The automatic system then locked the spoilers at 15°. As a result, instead of slowing down, the aircraft began to accelerate. At first, no one in the cockpit noticed the increase in engine thrust. Seeing that the speed was not decreasing but actually growing, the pilots applied emergency braking and held the wheels locked, which was contrary to the aircraft operating manual. The flight engineer then reduced thrust on the engines in takeoff mode and eventually shut all the engines down.

By that time, the aircraft had reached a speed of about 270 km/h and was only 655 meters from the end of the runway. With the wheels locked, the tires began to burst. Because of this, and also because all the engines were now shut down, the speed dropped to about 200 km/h. But the runway had already ended and the airliner overran onto the unpaved area.

It then crossed the runway end safety area, hit obstacles and broke apart. There was no fire. All three landing gear legs collapsed, and the fuselage broke in three places. Nevertheless, nobody was killed. Two people received serious injuries and four others sustained minor injuries.

The investigation commission concluded that the crew was fully responsible for the accident. The flight engineer, due to insufficient professional skills, made an error in handling the engines and spoilers during landing. This led to the unintentional and unexpected selection of forward takeoff thrust on engines No. 1 and 4 instead of reverse thrust.

The crew as a whole was poorly organized and failed to eliminate the consequences of their colleague’s mistake. The reasons for this included:

- the high verbal workload imposed on the crew during landing by the applicable procedures;

- the operator’s failure to implement the Ministry of Civil Aviation’s recommendations on forming crews with regard to psychophysiological and socio-psychological compatibility;

- failure to comply with the ministry’s requirement to train crews in handling abnormal situations in realistic aerodrome conditions.

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Air crash. Investigations ✈️

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