According to Theophrastus, this ambiguity is resolved by looking to reality, that is, whether its matter is necessary or possible. This resembles the position of those who uphold the doctrine of essence and derivative existence , where matters are of the nature of the thing itself, unlike the proponents of essence and real existence Alexander of Aphrodisias objects to this procedure on the grounds that if the resolution of the proposition's ambiguity were acquired in this way, error would become impossible. The point here is that, based on Theophrastus’ view, the proposition would be nothing more than a direct mirror of the nature of the thing and the way the soul apprehends it. But if the proposition refers to the thing exactly as it is in itself, how could it be false? In that case, the criterion of truth and falsity would become psychological. As for Alexander, the solution must be sought from within the proposition itself—within its structure—without recourse to what lies outside it. This dispute is similar to the one between Psychologism and Continental Kevin L said in Ways into the Logic of Alexander [And the meaning of the ambiguity of the proposition here concerns the materials of the proposition in terms of whether they are necessary or impossible. The solution to the ambiguity of the proposition according to Theophrastus is that we look to the materials of the proposition outside it, that is, whether they are necessary or possible. This is similar to the saying of those who hold the doctrine of essence and real existence, where the materials return, according to them, to existence and not to essence, unlike the position of those who hold the doctrine of essence and source-existence. Alexander objected to this, saying that if we say that propositions are taken in this way, it would become impossible for us to err in attributing the materials to the proposition. The explanation of this is that the proposition, according to Theophrastus, is nothing but a direct mirror of the nature of the thing and how the soul perceives it. If the proposition names the thing as it is in itself, how then could it be false? Thus the criterion of truth and falsity becomes psychological. For Alexander, the solution lies within the limits of the terms and predicates of the proposition without looking at what is outside it. This is itself the issue of the disagreement concerning the determination of the modalities of propositions between logical psychologism and the categorical approach، Kevin L said in Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias: “Ambiguity is to be resolved by considering the subject matter to which a proposition refers. Or more precisely, whereas Theophrastus's inclination says to look to the concrete world—or, at least, to something conceived of as outside logic in order to determine the mode of the assertoric premiss in NAaB & BaC→ ? AcC, Alexander sees the problems inherent in this procedure. As he at in A. Pr., if one allows that propositions take their necessity, actuality or contingency “from what underlies them and is meant by them,” it would be impossible to be in error in attributing to them a mode. For there would be no false utterances if something were only called an utterance if it signified the nature of the objects and were of the same kind as the things it signified some affirmative Propositions are true and others are false (namely, those that do not describe their subjects as they are), so we shall also say that some necessary propositions are false. False necessary propositions will be those which say that what is not necessary is necessary]
